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Abstract Security patterns are a useful way of describing, packaging and apply-
ing security knowledge which might otherwise be unavailable. However, because
patterns represent partial knowledge of a problem and solution space, there is little
certainty that addressing the consequences of one problem won’t introduce or exac-
erbate another. Rather than using patterns exclusively to explore possible solutions
to security problems, we can use them to better understand the security problem
space. To this end, we present a framework for evaluating the implications of secu-
rity and attack patterns using premortems: scenarios describing a failed system that
invites reasons for its failure. We illustrate our approach using an example from the
EU FP 7 webinos project.
1 Contextualising Patterns for Security Design
Because security knowledge isn’t readily available in design situations, there is con-
siderable value in codifying and packaging it. Given both the adversarial nature of
security, and the dangers of over or underestimation of security issues when this
nature is misunderstood, it also seems useful to package knowledge about attacks as
patterns. From a practitioner perspective, it seems surprising that, despite an abun-
dance of examples of how security knowledge can be codified as patterns, e.g. [1],
and the claim that building attack patterns is evidence of organisational security ma-
turity [2], there is a dearth of work describing the application of attack patterns in
security design.
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Characterising attack and misuse patterns, e.g. [3], has been helpful in illustrat-
ing how patterns can tackle specific problems, but patterns need to be contextualised
to be useful. One way of contextualising attack patterns involves better understand-
ing the motives and capabilities of an attacker. Steps towards this goal are being
made via profiling techniques [4], and the reuse of open-source intelligence for
building attacker personas [5]. However, even when contextualised, such representa-
tions remain only partial representation of an attacker’s knowledge. Although these
provide inspiration for undirected ideation activities, more relevant qualitative data
is needed to augment profiles or patterns to understand what specific attacks they
might carry out in specific contexts. If such data was available then attacks would
be self-evident, thereby eliminating the need for attack patterns.
2 Patterns as an exploratory tool
We may never have the assurances that we would like about a pattern’s efficacy;
while a pattern may be one possible solution to a problem, we can never be com-
pletely sure that this solution itself doesn’t introduce further complications we have
yet to identify. This is a symptom of the lack of clarity about what it means to secure
a system. This, in turn, makes it difficult to devise tests for proving a system is se-
cure, and a grasp of all possible solutions for satisfying a specified security problem
[6]. Patterns have the potential to provide this clarity because not only do they help
solve security problems, they can also help understand the problem space security
is concerned with as well. When we apply patterns, we also make value judgements
about how attacker patterns might exploit systems, or how different security patterns
might be a satisficing security design solution. These value judgements help us un-
derstand and delimit the solution space. Therefore, not only are patterns effective at
structuring knowledge, they also explore the consequences of their application. If
we can better understand these consequences, we can also better understand what is
important to us when thinking about system security.
Interestingly, the value associated with applying patterns to delimit the problem
space is obtained whether or not they successfully address the problem we had in
mind. While it seems paradoxical that we would apply a security pattern knowing
that it will ultimately fail, such an approach is analogous to a premortem. In busi-
ness scenario planning, these operate on the assumption that a solution has failed
and, rather than reflecting on what might have gone wrong, designers instead gen-
erate plausible reasons for explaining the solution’s failure [7]. Although the known
structure, motivation, and consequences of security patterns provide some insight
into the causes of such a failure, when combined with attack patterns, they allow
us to reflect on the motivations of a perceived attacker, and how his capabilities and
motivations ultimately led to an exploit. More interestingly, if the mapping between
patterns is not clear, the lack of data also provides clues about what additional evi-
dence is needed before the “cause of death” can be established.
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Fig. 1 A Framework for Evaluating Patterns with Premortems
3 Approach
To make the most of the exploratory power of both patterns and premortems, we
have devised an approach to evaluate the implications of applying security and
attack patterns. This entails combining security and attack patterns, and statically
evaluating the risk posed as a result. The risk impact is described using a premortem
scenario, and reasons for the failure described are solicited from domain experts or
stakeholders. Using KAOS goal and obstacle modelling techniques [8], the underly-
ing causes for these reasons are elicited as implicit requirements that hold when the
security pattern is applied. The obstacles and goals elicited are then used to refine
the select attack and security patterns respectively.
This approach, which we illustrate in Figure 1, relies on the open-source CAIRIS
security requirements management tool[9, 10]. It also relies on goal and risk mod-
elling techniques developed as part of the IRIS framework [11].
This approach is described in more detail in the following sub-sections.
3.1 Combine Security and Attack Patterns
The first step involves selecting a security and attack pattern to form the basis of
evaluation. The security pattern represents some aspect of a system architecture
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being evaluated, while the attack pattern represents elements of an insecure context
of use where the security pattern is being applied.
Both the attack and security pattern are described by XML documents, which are
imported into CAIRIS. Compared to the security patterns described by [1], the pat-
terns imported are architectural in nature. They include definitions for components,
connectors, and interfaces, as well as security values such as interface privileges, in-
terface and component access rights, and protocols associated with connectors. The
pattern structure also models assets associated with components and connectors, and
requirements that concern these assets.
The attack pattern structure is based on the classic “Gang of Four” design pattern
template [12], but is also aligned with the IRIS meta-model used by CAIRIS [13].
As such, each attack pattern corresponds to a single risk in IRIS [13].
The pattern structures for both are described in more detail in [14].
3.2 Project Risk Implications
Based on the assets, threats and vulnerabilities associated with the security and at-
tack patterns, a risk analysis is performed; this provides an initial evaluation of the
risk implications of the pattern combination.
This analysis is automatically carried out by CAIRIS based on the imported se-
curity and attack patterns. The results are visualised using CAIRIS’ risk modelling
notation; this is described in more detail by [15].
3.3 Author Premortem and Solict Premortem Responses
Using inspiration from both the patterns and the risk analysis, a premortem scenario
is written to characterise a system failure resulting from this application of both
patterns. Reasons for these failures can be elicited from a variety of different people.
These range from direct stakeholders, such as customers or project team members,
to indirect stakeholders, such as domain experts or members of the public.
Because premortems are not conceptually supported by CAIRIS, this scenario
is modelled as a misuse case [16] and associated with the risk resulting from the
pattern combination.
3.4 Analyse Premortem Reasons
Using KAOS obstacle models, each premortem reason is modelled as a set of obsta-
cles. Obstacles are abstracted to identify problems giving rise to these reasons; they
are also refined to identify conditions that need to be present for the reasons to hold.
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Where security pattern requirements mitigate these obstacles, obstacle resolution
links are added to the obstacle model.
To capture the insights resulting from this evaluation, the obstacle model is incor-
porated into the structure of the CAIRIS attack pattern. To facilitate this, the Data
Type Definition for attack pattern XML documents includes an implementation ele-
ment. This element allows an attack to be described textually and visually using an
obstacle model.
The implicit requirements that mitigate these obstacles are also incorporated into
the security pattern. These requirements are represented as goals trees, which are
associated with individual components in the pattern.
4 Example
We illustrate our approach by describing how it was used to evaluate aspects of the
security architecture of webinos. webinos is a software infrastructure for running
web applications across smartphones, PCs, home media centres, and in-car devices
[17]. webinos’ software architecture includes policy management components for
facilitating cross-device access control [18].
The process used to carry out an architectural risk analysis process was described
in [14]. Our approach complements that process by providing a framework for mov-
ing from the identification of general flaws and knowledge about known attacks, to
the discovery of risks resulting from ambiguity and inconsistency in a system de-
sign.
4.1 Combine Security and Attack Patterns
We wanted to consider how resistant the policy management architecture might be
to attempts to footprint, i.e. attempts to gather potentially exploitable information
about the system.
The security pattern is characterised using the Context Policy Management ar-
chitectural pattern [19]. This pattern realises the policy management requirements
specified by [18].
The initial attack pattern illustrated in Figure 2 was constructed by searching for
keywords associated with footprinting activities using open-source intelligence. In
this example, attacks and exploits were found by searching the Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) and Common Weakness Enumer-
ation (CWE) repositories [20, 21].
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Fig. 2 Initial attack pattern structure
4.2 Project Risk Implications
When the patterns were imported into CAIRIS, a risk model was automatically gen-
erated and a “Test footprinting” risk added to characterise the attack pattern.
When this risk model, which is illustrated in Figure 3, was automatically gener-
ated, the risk score seemed surprisingly low based on colour of the risk diamond.
In the risk model, the shade of red is used to indicate its seriousness; the darker the
shade, the more serious the risk is. Based on the initial lightness of the shade, the
risk was not considered significant. On further investigation, we discovered that this
was because no security properties were associated with the exploited Application
Data asset, despite an attack that compromised its accountability. This minimised
the impact of the threat, thereby lowering the overall risk rating. However, initially
contextualising the attack pattern with the Ethan attacker persona [22] indicated that
both integrity and accountability of this data needed to be maintained. Adding these
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Fig. 3 CAIRIS Risk Analysis model of security and attack pattern elements
security properties to the Application Data asset subsequently lead to the criticality
of risk being increased.
4.3 Author Premortem and Solict Premortem Responses
Inspired by the risk model, we developed the premortem scenario below to charac-
terise the implications of an access control failure.
The Register picked up a story based on blog reports by irate mobile users com-
plaining about increased email spam since they started using webinos applications;
this spam is sufficiently targeted that it evades spam filters. This has led to lots of
irate twitter posts appearing on the twitter feed on the webinos home page, espe-
cially from angry developers who users blame for this traffic. As the bad press grew
and open-source advocates began to criticise the project, major partners began to
leave the project, and EC funding was cut; this lead to the project being halted due
to lack of money.
This premortem scenario was emailed to all members of the webinos project
team, who were asked to reply to the email with their reasons for the described
failure. Although the most active members of the project team were web app de-
velopers, the team also included participants with backgrounds in handset and car
manufacturing, and mobile market analysis.
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4.4 Analyse Premortem Reasons
Several possible reasons for this failure were proposed. These ranged from the re-
selling of private application data, through to attackers actively footprinting the net-
work infrastructure hosting the cloud-based hubs for webinos personal zones. For
reasons of brevity, we will consider only one of these: one team member suggested
that webinos’ access control policies might be open to ambiguity, and that this could
lead to information being shared against the wishes of end users.
Using the ambiguity analysis techniques described in [14], it was possible to de-
rive the obstacle model illustrated in Figure 4. The Test Footprinting attack pattern
was revised to incorporate this obstacle model as rationale for the attack [23]. Addi-
tionally, insights about these reasons lead to revisions to the access right, protocol,
and privilege values associated with the Context Policy Management architectural
pattern.
Fig. 4 Obstacle model associated with premortem reason
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5 Implications
Devising and applying this premortems-based approach to pattern evaluation has
broader implications on the design and evaluation of security. We describe some of
these in the following sub-sections.
5.1 Analysing incomplete risk models
The Test Footprinting attack pattern sketched in Figure 2 made assumptions about
both vulnerable assets, and assets used as part of a broader exploit. Because the IRIS
meta-model assumes these assets are known when specifying risks, these assump-
tions needed to be made early. However, while indications about vulnerable assets
may be known at an early stage, it’s unlikely that details about exploited assets will
be known. If inappropriate assets, or asset security properties are elicited at this early
stage, the visual risk models can help identify this. However, inappropriate assets or
asset values may also inspire inappropriate premortems; these are less easy to iden-
tity, and may lead to the exploration of inappropriate parts of the problem space.
While there is no easy remedy to this problem, it does suggest that risk models may
benefit from being less specific at an early stage; this has implications on how risks
might be appropriately analysed and visualised using incomplete information.
5.2 Measuring quality concerns
As well as evaluating the implications of attack and security patterns, this approach
also helps us measure quality concerns. Responses given by project team members
may be complicated, simple, pessimistic, or optimistic. In each case, however, they
say something about how confident team members are about either the system or
the context it is situated in. This suggests that premortem responses are a useful tool
for managers to keep in touch with the security reality of a project.
We can also use this approach to understand why security systems may not sat-
isfy quality requirements we expect to hold. For example, we may expect a combi-
nation of security patterns to fail fast and predictably for different attack patterns. If
we write a premortem describing a system that fails slowly and unpredictably then
responses might help us to identify what we need to do to fix these problems.
5.3 Engagement with hard to reach groups
Premortems allow organisational stakeholders with security interests, but a non-
IT background, to engage in security design. While time-constrained stakeholders,
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such as senior managers, may find it difficult to take time out to engage in de-
sign activities, they might it easier to provide short, thought-provoking feedback to
scenarios that capture their imagination. When these responses are recorded, they
can formally acknowledge their contribution to the design process. However, be-
cause premortems are successful because contributors don’t feel any responsibility
for their contribution, acknowledging these responses may lead to less than honest
responses.
5.4 Promoting Open Innovation
Although our approach relied on a predefined list of stakeholders for premortem
responses, we could also use Open Innovation to collect responses from a broader
base of external respondents. Open Innovation is a paradigm where both ideas and
paths to market are generated from both within and outside an organisation [24].
This can be made possible by using premortems to describe contextual information;
this is collected while combining patterns and projecting risks, particularly when
risks are rated at a lower than expected value. Using premortems, this contextual in-
formation could be shared without disclosing sensitive information about the nature
of the assets being exploited, potential attacks and attackers.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we described an approach where premortems were used to better
understand the problem and solution space associated with attack and security pat-
terns. We illustrated this approach using an example where this exploration lead to
more refined pattern descriptions.
We are currently exploring ways that CAIRIS can be updated to better address the
lessons learned applying this approach. For example, we are currently investigating
different ways of making the IRIS risk meta-model more permissive given the issues
raised in Section 5.1. We are also considering more effective ways of supporting
the premortem technique within CAIRIS and the broader IRIS framework. These
include devising more effective ways of supporting the elicitation of premortem
scenarios, and soliciting reason responses from appropriate stakeholders.
In future work, we will explore how this technique might be used by security
testers, in particular ethical hackers, to support a deep-dive analysis of a system.
In particular, we will consider how this approach provides a framework for taking
fresh thinking that ethical hackers can provide, and aligning this thinking with both
exploiting and mitigating system models.
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